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In the literature on optimal redistributive taxation initiated by Mirrlees (1971), non-employment,
if any, is synonymous with non-participation. The importance of participation decisions is not
debatable. However, according to Mirrlees (1999), ￿another desire is to have a model in which
unemployment [in our words, ￿non-employment￿ ] can arise and persist for reasons other than a
preference for leisure￿ . Along this view, it is important to recognize that some people remain
jobless despite they do search for a job at the market wage. To account for this fact, one should
depart from the assumption of walrasian labor markets. Our paper characterizes the optimal
redistribution policy in a framework where wages, employment, (involuntary) unemployment
and (voluntary) non participation are endogenously a⁄ected by taxation on labor income.
As it is standard in the optimal tax literature, we assume that the government is only able
to condition taxation on wages. Our economy is made of a continuum of skill-speci￿c labor
markets. On each of them, we introduce matching frictions ￿ la Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999). This setting is particularly attractive because both labor supply (along the participa-
tion/extensive margin) and labor demand determine the equilibrium levels of employment. In
our model, taxes are distorsive via the participation margin and the wage-cum-labor demand
margin. Concerning participation, we assume that whatever their skill level, individuals di⁄er in
their value of remaining out of the labor force.1 A higher level of taxes reduces the skill-speci￿c
value of participation, thereby inducing some individuals to leave the labor force. Labor demand
is a⁄ected by taxation through wage formation. In various wage-setting models, the equilibrium
gross wage maximizes an objective that is increasing in the after-tax (net) wage and decreasing
in the pre-tax (gross) wage. A higher pre-tax wage increases worker￿ s consumption but, for
instance, in a monopoly union model, it reduces the labor demand while it reduces ￿rms￿pro￿t
in Nash bargaining models. Since a compensated increase in tax progressivity renders a higher
pre-tax wage less attractive to workers, a lower pre-tax wage is substituted for a lower after-tax
wage.2 This wage moderation e⁄ect of tax progressivity stimulates labor demand and reduces
unemployment. In order to be as general as possible, we deal with wage-formation in a reduced
form way that is consistent with those properties.
As it is standard in the optimal taxation literature, we stick to the welfarist view according to
which the government￿ s objective depends on utility levels. Moreover, in order to focus sharply
on redistributive issues, we assume that the economy without taxes (laissez faire) is e¢ cient
1Because of this additional unobserved heterogeneity, the government has to solve an adverse selection problem
with « random participation » ￿ la Rochet and Stole (2002).
2It is worth noting that this mechanism also holds in the textbook competitive labor supply framework. There,
the after-tax wage equals consumption and a higher pre-tax wage is obtained thanks to more e⁄ort. Hence,
solving the consumption/leisure tradeo⁄ amounts to maximize an objective that is increasing in the net wage and
decreasing in the gross wage. For simplicity, we ignore labor supply responses along the intensive margin in our
model.
2(in the Benthamite sense). When the government has a Maximin (Rawlsian) objective, it only
values the utility level of the unemployed. The optimal tax schedule has then clear analytical
properties if the elasticities of participation verify a monotonicity assumption. In the most
plausible case, these elasticities are decreasing along the skill distribution, so the participation
rates are more elastic for low skilled labor markets than for high skilled ones. Then, we prove
that optimal marginal tax rates are positive everywhere and optimal average tax rates are
increasing. The reason is that a more progressive tax schedule increases the level of tax at
the top of the skill distribution where participation decisions are less elastic and decreases the
level of tax where participation reacts more strongly to the tax pressure. Since redistribution
lowers participants￿expected surplus, the participation rate is lower at the optimum than at the
laissez faire. However, a more progressive tax schedule distorts wages and unemployment rates
downwards. Thus, at the optimum, the e¢ ciency losses generated by the wage and employment
distortions equalize the net gains due to redistribution.
We also derive the optimal tax formula under a general utilitarian criterion. As in the
Maximin case, we provide a formula that expresses the optimal tax as a function of behavioral
elasticities and the skill distribution. We also interpret this formula by considering a marginal tax
reform around the optimum. Unemployment has now two e⁄ects on social welfare that cannot
be recognized if the wage-cum-labor demand margin is ignored. First, since income net of taxes
and transfers has to be higher in employment than in non-employment (to induce participation),
unemployment per se causes a loss in social welfare. Second, because some participants to the
labor market are eventually unemployed, enhancing participation increases earnings inequalities,
which has a detrimental e⁄ect on social welfare. Compared to the Maximin case, these channels
call for further downward distortions of wages and push down the optimal unemployment rates.
To illustrate how our optimal tax formulas could be used for applied purposes, we calibrate
our model for the US economy. Our numerical results illustrate the properties found in the
Maximin case and cast light on the more complex mechanisms at work in the general utilitarian
case. In the Maximin case, it turns out that the optimal tax pro￿le is well approximated
by an assistance bene￿t tapered away at a high and nearly constant rate. If the government
maximizes a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, the optimal tax pro￿le is di⁄erent with
hump-shaped marginal tax rates. Moreover, an EITC can be optimal.
A number of studies are related to our work. In the optimal taxation literature that follows
Mirrlees (1971), the intensive margin (i.e. work e⁄ort) is the only source of deadweight losses.
In this competitive labor market model, tax progressivity induces a downward distortion of work
e⁄ort and thus of pre-tax wages. In our non-competitive model, tax progressivity reduces pre-tax
wages and increases labor demand. Thus, the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄ in our non walrasian
labor market framework is dramatically di⁄erent from the one appearing in the Mirrleesian
3literature. Both mechanisms can account for the empirical fact that gross incomes decrease with
marginal tax rates (Feldstein, 1995, Gruber and Saez, 2002). Whether this wage moderating
e⁄ect of tax progressivity is due to a labor supply response along the intensive margin or to
a non competitive wage formation remains an open empirical question. However, we believe
that the mechanism on which our model is based might be crucial. On the one hand, Blundell
and MacCurdy (1999) and Meghir and Phillips (2008) conclude that the labor supply responses
along the intensive margin are empirically very small. On the other hand, Manning (1993)
￿nds a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect of tax progressivity on the UK unemployment rate (see also
Słrensen 1997 and Rłed and Strłm 2002).
There is now growing evidence that the extensive margin (i.e. participation decisions) mat-
ters a lot. Diamond (1980) and ChonØ and Laroque (2005) have studied optimal income taxation
when individuals￿decisions are limited to a dichotomic choice about whether to work or not.
The optimum trades o⁄ the equity gain of a higher level of tax against the e¢ ciency loss of a
lower level of participation. However, gross incomes are not distorted in these models because
of a competitive labor market and exogenous productivity levels. Saez (2002) has proposed
a model of optimal taxation where both extensive and intensive margins of the labor supply
are present. He shows that the optimal tax schedule heavily depends on the comparison be-
tween the elasticities of participation decisions with respect to tax levels and of earnings with
respect to marginal tax rates. Our model emphasizes that the monotonicity of the elasticities
of participation is also important.
Some papers have made a distinction between unemployment and non-participation. Boad-
way et alii (2003) study redistribution when unemployment is endogenous and generated by
matching frictions or e¢ ciency wages. The government￿ s information set is di⁄erent from ours
because they assume that it observes productivities and can distinguish among the various types
of non-employed. Boone and Bovenberg (2004) depart from the standard model of nonlinear
income taxation ￿ la Mirrlees (1971) by adding a job-search margin that is the single determi-
nant of the unemployment risk. As in our model, the government can not verify job search.
However, in their model, the cost of participation is homogeneous in the population and the
unemployment risk does not depend on wages nor on taxation. In Boone and Bovenberg (2006),
the framework is similar but since the government observes employed workers￿skill, taxation
is skill-speci￿c. Their focus is on the respective roles of the assistance bene￿t and of in-work
bene￿ts in redistributing income while ours is on redistributive taxation when the government
observes only wages.
Closely related to the current paper, Hungerb￿hler et alii (2006), henceforth HLPV, have
proposed an optimal income tax model with unobservable worker￿ s ability and where unemploy-
ment is endogenous due to matching frictions. The present paper di⁄ers from HLPV in four
4important respects. First, the cost of participation takes a unique value in HLPV. Hence, every
agent above (below) an endogenous threshold of skill participates (does not participate). In the
present paper, we allow the opportunity cost of participation to vary within and between skill
levels. This leads to a more general and to us much more realistic treatment of participation
decisions. In this sense, HLPV is a particular case of the present paper where the elasticity of
participation is in￿nite at the threshold, and zero above. Second, following Saez (2001), the
present paper expresses our optimality conditions in terms of behavioral elasticities and inter-
prets them in the light of marginal tax reforms. This emphasizes the economics behind the
optimal tax formulas. Moreover, in the Maximin case, it reveals the critical role played by the
shape of the elasticities of participation along the skill distribution. Third, the social welfare
function in HLPV does not take into account the issue of income redistribution between em-
ployed and non-employed individuals of the same skill level. On the contrary, our paper deals
with this issue, a point that appears important when workers are involuntarily unemployed.
Finally, in both papers wage-setting implies that the laissez-faire allocation is e¢ cient but our
paper is compatible with a wider class of matching functions. As a matter of fact, by focusing on
Nash bargaining over wages under the so-called Hosios (1990), HLPV restrict to Cobb-Douglas
matching functions.
The paper is organized as follows. The model and ￿scal incidence are presented in the next
section. Section III characterizes the Maximin optimum. Section IV presents the optimality
conditions under the general utilitarian criterion. Section V explains how we calibrate the model
and presents numerical simulations of optimal tax schedules. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II The model
As usual in the optimal non linear tax literature that follows Mirrlees (1971), we consider a static
framework where the government is averse to inequality. For simplicity we assume risk-neutral
agents. In our model, the sources of di⁄erences in earnings are threefold. First, individuals are
endowed with di⁄erent levels of productivity (or skill) denoted by a. The distribution of skills
admits a continuous density function f (:) on a support [a0;a1], with 0 ￿ a0 < a1 ￿ +1. The
size of the population is normalized to 1. Second, whatever their skill, some people choose to
stay out of the labor force while some others do participate to the labor market. To account for
this fact, we assume that individuals of a given skill di⁄er in their individual-speci￿c gain ￿ of
remaining out of the labor force. We call ￿ the value of non-market activities. Third, among
those who participate to the labor market, some fail to be recruited and become unemployed.
This ￿involuntary￿unemployment is due to matching frictions ￿ la Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) and Pissarides (2000). Labor markets are perfectly segmented by skill. This assumption
is made for tractability and seems more realistic than the polar one of a unique labor market
5for all skill levels. The timing of events is the following:
1. The government commits to an untaxed assistance bene￿t b and a tax function T (:) that
only depends on the (gross) wage w.3
2. For each skill level a, ￿rms decide how many vacancies to create. Creating a vacancy of
type a costs ￿(a). Individuals of type (a;￿) decide whether they participate to the labor
market of type a.
3. On each labor market, the matching process determines the number of ￿lled jobs. Since
an individual of type (a;￿) who chooses to participate renounces ￿, all participants of
skill a are alike. We henceforth call these individuals participants of type a for short.
Each participant supplies an exogenous amount of labor normalized to 1. So, earnings and
(gross) wages are equal.
4. Each worker of skill a produces a units of goods, receives a wage w = wa and pays taxes.
Taxes ￿nance the assistance bene￿t b and an exogenous amount of public expenditures
E ￿ 0. Agents consume.
We assume that the government does neither observe individuals￿types (a;￿) nor the job-
search and matching processes.4 It only observes workers￿gross wages wa and is unable to
distinguish among the non-employed individuals those who have searched for a job but failed
to ￿nd one (the unemployed) from the non participants.5 Moreover, as our model is static, the
government is unable to infer the type of a jobless individual from her past earnings. Therefore,
the government is constrained to give the same level of assistance bene￿t b to all non-employed
individuals, whatever their type (a;￿) or their participation decisions.6 An individual of type
(a;￿) can decide to remain out of the labor force, in which case her utility equals b+￿. Otherwise,
she ￿nds a job with an endogenous probability ‘a and gets a net-of-tax wage wa ￿T (wa) or she
becomes unemployed with probability 1 ￿ ‘a and gets the assistance bene￿t b.7
3If the income tax and the assistance schemes were administered by di⁄erent authorities, new issues would
arise that we do not consider here.
4The government is therefore unable to infer the skill of workers from the screening of job applicants made by
￿rms. So, the tax schedule cannot be skill-speci￿c. Moreover, we do not consider the possibility that redistribution
could also be based on observable characteristics related to skills (see Akerlof, 1978).
5However, the government is able to compute the skill-speci￿c unemployment and participation rates. It also
knows the density f(:) and the boundaries of the support of a.
6Similarly, in Boone and Bovenberg (2004, 2006), the welfare bene￿t does not depend on the ability of the
jobless individual.
7Our model can easily be extended to include a skill-speci￿c ￿xed cost of working.
6II.1 Participation decisions
To participate, an individual of type (a;￿) should expect an income, ‘a (wa ￿ T (wa))+(1 ￿ ‘a)b,
higher than in case of non participation, b + ￿. Let
￿a
def
￿ ‘a (wa ￿ T (wa) ￿ b)
denote the expected surplus of a participant of type a. Let G(a;:) be the cumulative distribution
of the value of non-market activities, conditional on the skill level, that is
G(a;￿)
def
￿ Pr[￿ ￿ ￿ja]
Then, the participation rate among individuals of skill a equals G(a;￿a) and hence the number
of participants of type a equals Ua = G(a;￿a)f (a). We denote the continuous conditional
density of the value of non-market activities by g (a;￿). The support of g (a;:) is an interval





￿a ￿ g (a;￿a)
G(a;￿a)
(1)
the elasticity of the participation rate with respect to ￿, at ￿ = ￿a. This elasticity is in general
both endogenous and skill-dependent. Note that ￿a also equals the elasticity of the participation
rate of agents of skill a with respect to wa￿T (wa)￿b when ‘a is ￿xed. The empirical literature
typically estimates the latter elasticity.
II.2 Labor demand
On the labor market of skill a, creating a vacancy costs ￿(a) > 0. This cost includes the
investment in equipment and the screening of applicants. Only a fraction of vacancies ￿nds a
suitable worker to recruit. Following the matching literature (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999,
Pissarides 2000 and Rogerson et alii 2005), we assume that the number of ￿lled positions is
a function H (a;Va;Ua) of the numbers Va of vacancies and Ua of job-seekers. The matching
function H (a;:;:) on the labor market of skill a is increasing in both arguments and exhibits
constant returns to scale.8 Moreover, H (a;Va;0) = H (a;0;Ua) = 0, and for all Va and Ua,
one has H (a;Va;Ua) < min(Va;Ua). Finally, H (:;:;:) is twice-continuously di⁄erentiable on
[a0;a1] ￿ R2
+.
De￿ne tightness ￿a as the ratio Va=Ua. The probability that a vacancy is ￿lled equals
q (a;￿a)
def
￿ H (a;1;1=￿a) = H (a;Va;Ua)=Va. Due to search-matching externalities, the job-
￿lling probability decreases with the number of vacancies and increases with the number of job-
seekers. Because of constant returns to scale, only tightness matters and q (a;￿a) is a decreasing
8See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for microfoundations and empirical evidence about the matching func-
tion.
7function of ￿a. Symmetrically, the probability that a job-seeker ￿nds a job is an increasing
function of tightness p(a;￿a)
def
￿ H (a;￿a;1) = H (a;Va;Ua)=Ua. Firms and individuals being
atomistic, they take tightness ￿a as given.
When a ￿rm creates a vacancy of type a, she ￿lls it with probability q (a;￿a). Then, her pro￿t
at stage 4 equals a￿wa. Therefore, her expected pro￿t at stage 2 equals q (a;￿a)(a ￿ wa)￿￿(a).
Firms create vacancies until the free-entry condition q (￿a)(a ￿ wa) = ￿(a) is met. This pins












At the equilibrium, one has ‘a = L(a;wa) and
￿a = L(a;wa)(wa ￿ T (wa) ￿ b) (3)
The L(:;:) function is a reduced form that captures everything we need on the labor de-
mand side. From the assumptions made on the matching function, L(:;:) is twice-continuously
di⁄erentiable and admits values within (0;1). As the wage increases, ￿rms get lower pro￿t
on each ￿lled vacancy, fewer vacancies are created and tightness decreases. This explains why
@L=@wa < 0. Moreover, due to the constant-returns-to-scale assumption, the probability of
being employed depends only on skill and wage levels and not on the number of participants.
If for a given wage, there are twice more participants, the free-entry condition leads to twice
more vacancies, so the level of employment is twice higher and the employment probability is
una⁄ected. This property is in accordance with the empirical evidence that the size of the labor
force has no lasting e⁄ect on group-speci￿c unemployment rates. Finally, because labor markets
are perfectly segmented by skill, the probability that a participant of type a ￿nds a job depends
only on the wage level wa and not on wages in other segments of the labor market.
II.3 The wage setting
As the literature dealing with optimal redistribution in a competitive framework (Mirrlees 1971
and followers), we focus on the redistribution issue and abstract from the standard ine¢ ciency
arising from matching frictions. In other words, we consider a setting such that the role of
taxation is only to redistribute income (as in Mirrlees) and not to restore e¢ ciency.10 For
this purpose, we consider a wage-setting mechanism that maximizes the sum of utility levels
in the absence of taxes and bene￿ts. To obtain this property, the matching literature typically
assumes that wages are the outcome of a Nash bargaining and that the workers￿bargaining
power equals the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment (see Hosios
9Where q
￿1 (a;:) denotes the inverse function of ￿ 7! q (a;￿), holding a constant.
10Boone and Bovenberg (2002) studies how nonlinear taxation can restore e¢ ciency in a matching model where
the Hosios condition is not ful￿lled.
81990). This assumption is only meaningful if the elasticity of the matching function is constant
and exogenous. When the matching function is of the Cobb-Douglas form H (a;Ua;Va) = A
(Ua)
￿ (Va)
1￿￿, Equation (2) implies that L(a;w) = A1=￿ ((a ￿ w)=￿(a))
((1￿￿)=￿). Then, Nash
bargaining under the Hosios condition leads to a wage level that solves (see HLPV):11
wa = argmax
w
L(a;w) ￿ (w ￿ T (w) ￿ b) (4)
When the matching function is not of the Cobb-Douglas form, we assume that (4) still holds.
So, ￿a = max
w
L(a;w)￿(w ￿ T (w) ￿ b) and the equilibrium wage maximizes the participation
rate given the tax/bene￿t system.
Di⁄erent wage-setting mechanisms can provide microfoundations for (4). The Competitive
Search Equilibrium introduced by Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996) leads to this property. An-
other possibility is to assume that a skill-speci￿c utilitarian monopoly union selects the wage
wa after individuals￿participation decisions but before ￿rms￿decisions about vacancy creation
(see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
II.4 The laissez faire
The laissez faire is de￿ned as the economy without tax and bene￿t. According to (4), the
equilibrium level of wage maximizes L(a;w)￿w. A wage increase has a direct positive e⁄ect on
L(a;w) ￿ w and a negative e⁄ect through the employment probability. To ensure that program
(4) is well-behaved at the laissez faire, we assume that for any (a;w),
@2 logL
@w ￿ @ logw
(a;w) < 0 (5)
We henceforth denote wLF
a the wage at the laissez faire. To guarantee that wLF
a increases with
the level of skill, we further assume that for any (a;w):
@2 logL
@a@w
(a;w) > 0 (6)
Appendix A veri￿es that, when the exogenous amount of public expenditures E is nil, the
laissez-faire economy maximizes the Benthamite objective, which equals the sum of utility levels.
Because of our wage-setting mechanism (4), wages at the laissez faire maximize ￿e¢ ciency￿(i.e.
maximize the Benthamite criterion). Note that participation decisions are then also e¢ cient.
II.5 Fiscal incidence
We now reintroduce the tax/bene￿t system and explain how tax reforms a⁄ect the equilibrium.
Starting with the wage, notice that the objective in (4) multiplies the employment probability
11If di⁄erent wage levels solve (4), then we make the tie-breaking assumption that the wage level preferred by
the government will be selected. See also the discussion in Mirrlees (1971, footnotes 2 and 3 pages 177).
9by the di⁄erence between the net incomes in employment and in unemployment. We call this
di⁄erence the ex-post surplus and denote it x
def
￿ w ￿ T (w) ￿ b. It subtracts an ￿employment
tax￿ , T(w)+b, from the earnings w. In our setting, the in￿ uence of the tax and bene￿t system
comes through the pro￿le of the relationship between the ex-post surplus x and earnings w.
Because of the multiplicative form of (4), what actually matters is how logx varies with logw.














@ log(w ￿ T (w) ￿ b)
@ logw
(8)
When the wage increases by one percent, the term @ logL=@ logw(a;w) measures the relative
decrease in the employment probability, while ￿ (w) measures the relative increase in the ex-
post surplus. At equilibrium, Equation (7) requires that these two relative changes sum to
zero. Notice that in our setting the pro￿le of ￿(w) gathers all the information about the pro￿le
of the tax/bene￿t system needed to ￿x the equilibrium wage. Figure 1 displays indi⁄erence
expected surplus curves. The equation of these indi⁄erence curves can be written as logx =
constant ￿ logL(a;w). From (2) and (5), these curves are increasing and convex. The solution
to Program (4) then consists in choosing the highest indi⁄erence curve taking the relationship
between logx and logw into account. In case of di⁄erentiability, this amounts to choosing the
highest indi⁄erence curve tangent to the logw 7! logx = log(w ￿ T(w) ￿ b) schedule. The
￿rst-order condition (7) combined with (8) expresses this tangency condition.
For comparative static purposes, consider for a while the average tax rate T (wa)=wa, the
assistance bene￿t ratio b=wa and the marginal tax rate T0 (wa) as parameters. So, ￿(wa) is
provisionally a parameter, too. Under Condition (5), Equations (7) and (8) imply that the
equilibrium wage wa (thereby the unemployment rate 1￿L(a;wa)) increases with the average tax
rate and the assistance bene￿t ratio and decreases with the marginal tax rate. These properties
are standard in the equilibrium unemployment literature. They hold under monopoly unions
(Hersoug 1984), right-to-manage bargaining (Lockwood and Manning 1993), e¢ ciency wages
with continuous e⁄ort (Pisauro 1991) or matching models with Nash bargaining (Pissarides
1998). Słrensen (1997) and Rłed and Strłm (2002) provide some empirical evidence in favor
12The solution to (4), if any, necessarily lies in (￿1;a ￿ ￿(a)). Since L(a;a ￿ ￿(a)) = 0, w = a￿￿(a) does not
solve (4). From a theoretical viewpoint, the wage can be negative whenever T (:) is negative enough to keep some
agents of type a participating to the labor market (i.e. w ￿ T (w) > b). Hence the solution to (4) is necessarily
interior. In the rest of the paper, we focus on positive wage levels.
Since @ logL=@w < 0, ￿ (w) has to be positive. As the expected surplus is positive, so is w ￿ T (w) ￿ b. Hence,
the marginal tax rate T
0 (w) has to be lower than 1.
13￿ (w) is reminiscent of the Coe¢ cient of Residual Income Progression which measures the wage elasticity of
net earnings (Musgrave and Musgrave 1976). ￿ (w) is actually the Coe¢ cient of Residual Income Progression






log(L(a,w)) + log(x) = constant
Figure 1: The choice of the wage for a type a match.
of the wage-moderating e⁄ect of higher marginal tax rates. In addition, Manning (1993) ￿nds
that higher marginal tax rates lower unemployment in the UK.
From Equation (7), the average tax rate, the assistance bene￿t ratio and the marginal tax
rate a⁄ect the equilibrium wage only through changes in the slope ￿ of the logw 7! logx
function. To see why, imagine a tax reform such that participants of type a face a steeper
logw 7! logx tax function. A relative rise in the wage induces now a higher relative gain
in the ex-post surplus x. Still, the relative loss in the employment probability is unchanged.
Consequently, the rise in ￿ induces an increase in the equilibrium wage wa that substitutes
ex-post surplus for employment probability. This is reminiscent of the substitution e⁄ect in a
competitive framework with adjustments along the intensive margin. There, a lower marginal
tax rate raises the net hourly wage and leads to a substitution toward consumption and away
from leisure time. Returning to our setting, Equation (7) indicates that for a given slope of the
logw 7! logx function, the level of this function does not a⁄ect the equilibrium wage. In this
speci￿c sense, there is no income e⁄ect of the tax schedule on wages in our model.
In the general case where ￿ is a function of the wage, a change in this slope produces a direct
change in wage levels. This in turn creates a second change in ￿ which produces a further change
in the wage. To clarify this circular process14 and to prepare the analysis developed in Sections
III and IV in terms of a small tax reform, imagine that the slope ￿(w) of the logw 7! logx
relationship exogenously increases by a small amount ~ ￿. Let us rewrite the ￿rst-order condition
14Which is also present in the optimal non-linear taxation literature with competitive labor markets and labor
supply decisions (see Saez 2001).






(a;w) + ￿ (w) + ~ ￿ (9)
The second-order condition of (4) writes W0
w (wa;a;0) ￿ 0 where
W0
w (wa;a;~ ￿) =
@2 logL(a;wa)
@w ￿ @ logw
+ ￿0 (wa)
This second-order condition states that at the equilibrium wage wa, the logw 7! logx relation-
ship depicted in Figure 1 has to be either concave or less convex than the indi⁄erence expected
surplus curves.15
Consider now how the equilibrium wage wa is in￿ uenced by small changes in the parameter
~ ￿ and in the type a. Whenever the second-order condition of (4) is a strict inequality, we can
apply the implicit function theorem on W (wa;a;~ ￿) = 0. We then obtain the elasticity "a of
the equilibrium wage wa with respect to a small local change in ~ ￿ around a given logw 7! logx
function. We also obtain the elasticity ￿a of the equilibrium wage wa with respect to the skill




























(a;wa) > 0 (10b)
These elasticities are in general endogenous and in particular they depend on the curvature term
￿0 (wa) in W0
w. This is because a change in wage ￿wa, that is either caused by a change in ~ ￿ or
in a, induces a change in ￿ (wa) that equals ￿0 (wa)￿wa and a further change in the wage. This
is at the origin of a circular process captured by the term ￿0 (wa) in W0
w. However, as will be
clear in Sections III and IV, only the ratio "a=￿a enters the optimality conditions and this ratio
does not depend on ￿0 (wa) but only on a and wa. The positive signs of "a and ￿a follow from
the strict second-order condition W0
w< 0 and from (6).
In addition to its e⁄ect on wage and unemployment through ￿ (:), taxation also in￿ uences
participation decisions. To isolate this e⁄ect, consider a tax reform that rises log(w ￿ T (w) ￿ b)
by a constant amount for all w so that ￿ (w) is kept unchanged. Such a tax reform does neither
change the wage level, nor the employment probability. However, the employment tax T (wa)+b
is reduced and hence the surplus ￿a an agent of type a can expect from participation increases.
Therefore, such a reform increases the participation rate G(a;￿a), thereby the employment rate
L(a;wa) ￿ G(a;￿a). The magnitude of this behavioral response is captured by the elasticity ￿a
de￿ned in (1). In sum, the income e⁄ect a⁄ects the participation margin and not the wage-cum-
labor demand margin.
15When this condition is not veri￿ed over an interval, the earnings function a 7! wa is discontinuous.
12II.6 The equilibrium
For a given function logw 7! logx, the equilibrium allocation can be found recursively. The
wage-setting equations (4) determine wages wa and in turn xa = wa ￿T (wa)￿b. The labor de-
mand functions (2) determine the skill-speci￿c unemployment rates 1￿L(a;wa). Then, from (3),
the participation rates are given by G(a;￿a) and the employment rates equal L(a;wa)G(a;￿a).
For each additional worker of type a, the government collects taxes T (wa) and saves the assis-
tance bene￿t b. Since E ￿ 0 is the exogenous amount of public expenditures, the government￿ s




(T (wa) + b) ￿ L(a;wa) ￿ G(a;￿a) ￿ f (a)da ￿ E (11)
III The Maximin case
Under the Maximin (Rawlsian) objective, the government only values the utility of the least
well-o⁄. Unemployed individuals get b, which is always lower than the workers￿and non par-
ticipants￿utility levels, respectively w ￿ T (w) and b + ￿. Therefore, a Maximin government
aims at maximizing b subject to the budget constraint (11) and incentive compatibility con-
straints. The latter state that, for each skill level, the selected wage wa maximizes the expected
surplus L(a;w)(w ￿ T (w) ￿ b). According to the taxation principle (Hammond 1979, Rochet
1985 and Guesnerie 1995), the set of allocations induced by a tax/bene￿t system fT (:);bg










2 ￿a ￿ L(a;wa) xa ￿ L(a;wa0) xa0 (12)
From (6), the strict single-crossing condition holds. Hence (12) is equivalent to the di⁄erential
equation _ ￿a = ￿a ￿ @ logL=@a(a;wa) and the monotonicity requirement that the wage wa is a
nondecreasing function of the skill level a (see Appendix B).
Following Mirrlees (1971), it is much more convenient to solve the government￿ s problem
in terms of allocations.16 In Appendix C, we follow this approach to derive our optimal tax
formula. Let ha = L(a;wa) G(a;￿a) f (a) denote the (endogenous) mass of workers of skill a.
We obtain:
16We assume the existence of an optimal allocation a 7! (wa;xa) that is continuous, di⁄erentiable and increasing.
Existence and continuity are usual regularity assumptions (see e.g. Mirrlees 1971, 1976 or Guesnerie and La⁄ont
1984). The monotonicity assumption means that we rule out bunching. We verify in the simulations that
the monotonicity requirement is veri￿ed along the optimum. The di⁄erentiability assumption is made only for
convenience. It implies that the tax schedule T (:) is almost everywhere di⁄erentiable in the wage.
13Proposition 1 For any skill level a 2 [a0;a1], the maximin-optimal tax schedule veri￿es:









[xt ￿ ￿t (T (wt) + b)]ht ￿ dt; (13b)
where T(wt) + b = wt ￿ xt and since ￿ (w) = @ log(w ￿ T (w) ￿ b)=@ logw, xt veri￿es:




In Proposition 1, the elasticities ￿a of the participation rate, "a of the wage with respect to
￿ and ￿a of the wage with respect to the skill level a are respectively given by (1), (10a) and
(10b) along the optimal allocation. Moreover, wa is determined by the wage-setting condition
(7).
III.1 Intuitive proof of Proposition 1
The resolution in terms of incentive-compatible allocations enables a rigorous derivation. How-
ever, this method does not provide much economic intuition. So, we propose here an intuitive
proof in the spirit of Saez (2001). Recall that in our model, it is much more convenient to think
of the tax schedule as a function that associates the log of the ex-post surplus to the log of the
wage. We consider the e⁄ect of the following small tax reform around the optimum depicted
in Figure 2. The slope ￿(w) of logw 7! logx is marginally increased by ~ ￿ = ￿￿ for wages
in the small interval [wa ￿ ￿w;wa].17 We take ￿￿ su¢ ciently small compared to ￿w, so that
bunching or gaps in the wage distribution around wa ￿￿w or wa induced by the tax reform can
be neglected. This reform has two e⁄ects on the government￿ s objective (11). There is ￿rst a tax
level e⁄ect that concerns individuals of skill t above a. Those of them who are employed thus
receive a wage wt above wa. Second, there is a wage response e⁄ect. It takes place for those
whose wages lie in the [wa ￿ ￿w;wa] interval.
The tax level e⁄ect
Consider skill levels t above a. Since ￿ (:) is unchanged around wt, the equilibrium wage wt is
una⁄ected by the tax reform, and so is the employment probability L(t;wt). From (8), the tax






17The reasoning below will be entirely developed in terms of this local change in ￿. For the reader interested
by the implementation of such a reform, the small local increase ￿￿ would be the result of a small decline in the
marginal tax rate, the level of the average employment tax being kept locally constant. Above wa, the induced
reduction in the employment tax should be compensated for by an appropriate reduction of the marginal tax rate
to keep ￿ unchanged.
14log(w)
log(x) = log(w– T(w)–b)
log(wa-dw) log(wa)
Dh > 0
Tax level effect, due to
Dxt/xt = Dh × (dw/w)
dlog(w) = dw/w
Wage response effect, due to
Dwa/wa = ea × (Dh/h) > 0
Before reform schedule
After reform schedule
Figure 2: The tax reform
Wage response e⁄ect Tax Level e⁄ect
Due to: ￿wa=wa = "a (￿￿=￿) ￿xt=xt = ￿￿ (￿w=w)
Mechanical Component T (wa) increases by T (wt) decreases by
T0 (wa) ￿wa ￿T (wt) = ￿￿xt
Behavioral component Labor demand is reduced by Participation rates increase by:
￿‘a=‘a = ￿￿ (wa)(￿wa=wa) ￿Gt=Gt = ￿t (￿xt=xt)
Table 1: Summary of the di⁄erent components of the e⁄ects of the tax reform
(see Figure 2). The consequence of this rise of (the log of) the ex-post surplus can be decomposed
into a mechanical component and a behavioral component through a change in the participation
decisions (see Table 1).
The rise in xt corresponds to a reduction in the employment tax level T (wt) + b such that
￿(T (wt) + b) = ￿xt ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (￿w=w). Since there are ht workers of type t, the mechanical
component of the tax level e⁄ect at skill level t equals:




Consider now the participation decisions of individuals of skill t above a. From (3), since
their employment probability is unchanged, their expected surplus increases by the same relative
amount ￿￿t=￿t = ￿￿ ￿ (￿w=w) as their ex-post surplus xt. According to (1) the number of
employed individuals of type t thus increases by ￿t￿ht￿￿￿￿(￿w=w). For each of these additional
employed individuals, the government receives T (wt) + b additional employment taxes. Hence,
the behavioral component of the tax level e⁄ect at skill level t equals:




From (13b), the sum of the mechanical and behavioral components over all skill levels t
above a gives the tax level e⁄ect. It equals ￿Za ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (￿w=w).
15The wage response e⁄ect
This e⁄ect concerns individuals whose skill level is such that their wage in case of employ-
ment lies in the interval [wa ￿ ￿w;wa]. Let [a ￿ ￿a;a] be the corresponding interval of the skill








Therefore, the number of agents concerned by this e⁄ect is (a=￿a)f (a)(￿w=w).
Due to the small tax reform, those employed face a more increasing logw 7! logx tax
schedule. The tax reform thus induces a wage increase ￿wa that substitutes ex-post surplus for







Since the equilibrium wage maximizes participants￿ex-post surplus ￿a, the tax reform has only
a second-order e⁄ect on ￿a and thereby on the participation rate of these individuals. The wage
response e⁄ect can be decomposed into a mechanical component and a behavioral component
through a change in the labor demand decisions (see Table 1).
The wage increase ￿wa changes the employment tax paid by T0 (wa) ￿ ￿wa. From (8), one
gets 1 ￿ T0 (wa) = xa ￿ ￿(wa)=wa, so




Multiplying the last term by the number of employed individuals ha gives the mechanical com-
ponent of the wage response e⁄ect.
The wage increase ￿wa also induces a reduction in the employment probability L(a;wa).
Given (7), the fraction of employed among participants is decreased by:




When an additional participant of type a ￿nds a job, the government levies additional taxes
T (wa) and saves b. Multiplying the employment tax T (wa) + b by ￿‘a times the number of
participants G(a;￿a)f (a)￿a gives the behavioral component of the wage response e⁄ect. The
sum of these two components equals




Given (16), (17) and the last expression, the total wage response e⁄ect on the interval
[wa ￿ ￿w;wa] equals









The wage response e⁄ect can be either positive or negative. From Subsection II.4, recall that
the laissez-faire value of the wage is e¢ cient. If ￿ (wa) < 1, (resp. ￿ (wa) > 1) the wage is below
16(above) its laissez-faire value, hence it is ine¢ ciently low (high). Adding the wage response and
the tax level e⁄ects gives (13a) in Proposition 1.
To obtain Za0 = 0 in (13a), consider a tax reform that rises log(w ￿ T (w) ￿ b) by a constant
amount for all w, so that ￿ (w) is kept unchanged. This reform is implemented by increasing
the level of ￿a0 and thus the level of ￿a for all a (the rise in ￿a has to be a proportional rise
since _ ￿a = ￿a ￿ @ logL=@a(a;wa)). Such a tax reform induces an e⁄ect that is proportional to
Za0 and no wage response e⁄ect. At the optimum, such a marginal reform has to have no-￿rst-
order impact on the government￿ s objective. This implies that the sum of all mechanical and
behavioral e⁄ects has to be nil i.e. that Za0 = 0.
III.2 Instructive cases
To better understand the implications of our optimal tax formula, we now consider its implica-
tions when additional restrictions are imposed. Given the literature, a natural starting point is
the case where wages are exogenously ￿xed ("a = 0). Then, we return to the case where wages
are endogenous but impose some constraints on the elasticities of participation.
No wage response e⁄ect
We provisionally assume that marginal tax reforms do not change the employment probabili-
ties ‘a. However, wages still increase exogenously with the skill (i.e. ￿a remains positive). This
case corresponds to the model with only extensive margin responses of labor supply considered
by Diamond (1980), Saez (2002) and ChonØ and Laroque (2005).18 Intuitively, as wages do not
react to changes in taxes, the solution is given by putting to zero the sum of the mechanical
(14) and behavioral (15) components of the tax level e⁄ect. This has to be true for all levels of
skill. Consequently, xa ￿￿a (T (wa) + b) = 0 whatever the skill a.19 Therefore, at the optimum,
the employment tax (respectively, the employment surplus) verify:












These relationships are implicit ones when ￿a depends on the expected surplus. The optimal
employment tax rate only depends on the behavioral response (through ￿a) and not on the
distribution of skills. In Figure 1, the optimal allocation logxa is necessarily below the 45
degree line at a distance given by j log(￿a=(1 + ￿a)) j. In accordance with Saez (2002) in
the Maximin case, the employment tax T (wa) + b is positive i.e. there is no EITC. Where
the participation rate is more elastic, the behavioral component matters more. Therefore, the
18However here, as in Boone and Bovenberg (2004, 2006), participants face a positive but exogenous probability
to be ￿involuntarily￿unemployed.
19Formally, from (13a) as "a = 0 for all a, Za = 0 everywhere. So, from (13b), xa ￿ ￿a (T (wa) + b) = 0
everywhere, too.
17optimal ex-post surplus has to be higher to induce participation (a necessary condition to collect
taxes to ￿nance b).
Constant elasticity of participation
We now investigate under which condition the tax schedule described by Equation (21) is
optimal when wages are responsive to taxation ("a > 0). This tax schedule induces that the
aggregate tax level e⁄ect Za equals 0 everywhere along the skill distribution (See Equation 13b).
Therefore, the wage response e⁄ect has to be nil everywhere. So, according to (13a), the slope
￿ of the logw 7! logx function has to equal 1 everywhere. Therefore, from (8), the ratio xa=wa
has to be constant. This is consistent with (21) only when the elasticity of participation ￿a is
the same for all skill levels at the optimum.
Reciprocally, assume that the elasticity of participation is constant and consider the tax
policy de￿ned by an employment tax T (w) + b that equals w=(1 + ￿) for all wage levels w. In
this case, the mechanical (14) and behavioral (15) components of the tax level e⁄ect sum to 0
at each skill level. Moreover, from (8), this policy induces ￿ (w) to be constant and equal to 1,
so wages are not distorted and the wage response e⁄ect is nil everywhere. Therefore, this policy
satis￿es the conditions in Proposition 1.
Decreasing elasticity of participation
The assumption of a constant elasticity of participation is convenient but not plausible. Em-
pirical studies suggest that participation decisions are more elastic at the bottom of the skill
distribution (see the empirical evidence surveyed by Immervoll et alii, 2007, and Meghir and
Phillips, 2008). This elasticity is in general a function of the expected surplus (see (1)), hence
it is endogenous. Therefore, the pro￿le of ￿a at the optimum may be di⁄erent from the corre-
sponding pro￿le in the current economy. It seems nevertheless reasonable to assume that the
elasticity of participation is decreasing in skill levels along the optimum.20 In this case, we get:
Proposition 2 If everywhere along the Maximin optimum one has _ ￿a < 0, then
i) wa < wLF





for all a in (a0;a1), while wa0 = wLF






, wa1 = wLF






ii) Compared to the laissez faire, the participation rates are distorted downwards.
iii) The average tax rate T (w)=w is an increasing function of the wage and the marginal tax
rates T0 (w) are positive everywhere. The in-work bene￿t (if any) at the bottom-end of the
distribution is lower than the assistance bene￿t ￿T (wa0) < b.
20The polar assumption where ￿a is increasing in a leads to symetric analytical results. We do not present
them here since this case very implausible.
18This Proposition is proved in Appendix D. Its intuition is illustrated in Figure 3. This
Figure depicts the ratio of the ex-post surplus over the wage, xa=wa, as a function of the level
of skill. In the absence of wage responses, as we have seen above, the optimum implements a
policy such that xa=wa is equal to ￿a=(1 + ￿a) and hence the tax level e⁄ect is nil. The dashed
decreasing curve ￿a=(1 + ￿a) in Figure 3 illustrates this pro￿le in the current context where
_ ￿a < 0. However, when wages are responsive to taxation (i.e. when "a > 0), implementing this
policy means that xa = wa ￿ T (wa) ￿ b increases less than proportionally in the wage wa, so
￿ (wa) < 1. Hence, wages are distorted downwards. The optimum trades o⁄the distortions along
the wage response e⁄ect and along the tax level e⁄ect. Since an optimization along the wage
response e⁄ect corresponds to a ￿ at curve, the optimal policy corresponds to the one illustrated
by the solid curve in Figure 3. Thus, the solid curve remains decreasing, which induces that
wages and unemployment are distorted downwards for all interior skill levels (point i) of the
Proposition).
Whether participation rates are distorted upwards or downwards compared to the laissez







. Let us write ￿a as waL(a;wa) ￿ (xa=wa). First, since wages are distorted,
waL(a;wa) is lower at the optimum compared to the laissez faire. Second, as illustrated by
Figure 3 the ratio xa=wa reaches its highest value along the optimum for the lowest skill level.
Moreover, xa0=wa0 is lower at the optimum with wage response e⁄ect compared to the optimum
without wage response e⁄ect. These two features hold because the optimum with wage response
e⁄ect trades o⁄distortions along the tax level e⁄ect and along the wage response e⁄ect. Finally,
along the optimum without wage response e⁄ect, xa0=wa0 is lower than 1 because the government
has a Maximin objective (see 21). Hence, xa=wa < 1, which ￿nally gives point ii) of the
Proposition.
Moreover, as xa=wa < 1, one has T(w) + b > 0 for all wage levels. So, transfers for (low
income) workers are never higher than for the jobless: There is no EITC in the words of Saez
(2002, p. 1055). Furthermore, since x=w is decreasing, (T(w) + b)=w is increasing in wages,
hence average tax rates are increasing in wages, too. Finally, since (T(w) + b)=w is positive
everywhere and marginal tax rates are higher than this ratio (because ￿ < 1), marginal tax
rates are positive everywhere, including at the boundaries of the skill distribution (Point iii) of
the Proposition).
Point i) of the Proposition 2 is in contrast to the literature initiated by Mirrlees (1971).
There, optimal marginal tax rates are positive whenever the government values redistribution
(see e.g. the discussion in ChonØ and Laroque 2007). Therefore, labor supply, thereby the
volume of labor used, are distorted downwards, while in our case the volume of labor among





Figure 3: Intuition of Proposition 2
participation is distorted downwards. Consequently, the net e⁄ect on aggregate employment
is ambiguous. Proposition 2 generalizes HLPV. There, the value ￿ of non market activities
is identical for all types. Therefore, a unique threshold level of skill separates nonparticipants
from participants. The elasticity of participation is thus in￿nite at the threshold and then nil,
which is a very speci￿c decreasing a 7! ￿a relationship. Finally, the property according to which
employment tax rates are always positive is also obtained in the models of Saez (2002) and ChonØ
and Laroque (2005) where participation margins are central. Saez (2002) however emphasizes
that this result only holds under a Maximin criterion. With a more general objective, he ￿nds
that the optimal income tax schedule is typically characterized by a negative employment tax
at the bottom provided that labor supply responses along the extensive margin are high enough
compared to responses along the intensive margin.
IV The general utilitarian case
In this section, we derive the optimal tax formula when the government has the following








￿(b + ￿)g (a;￿)d￿gf (a)da
where ￿0 (:) > 0 > ￿00 (:). The ￿pure￿(Benthamite) utilitarian case sums the utility levels of
all individuals and corresponds to the case where ￿(:) is linear. The stronger the concavity of
￿(:), the more averse to inequality is the government. Under this objective, Appendix E shows
that the optimum veri￿es (recall that ‘a = L(a;wa) and ha = ‘a G(a;￿a) f (a)):
20Proposition 3 For any skill level a 2 [a0;a1], the optimal tax schedule veri￿es:
￿
1 ￿ ￿ (wa)
￿ (wa)
￿ wa ￿






￿ a ￿ ha = Za (23a)






￿0 (wt ￿ T (wt))
￿
￿
xt ￿ ￿t [T (wt) + b + ￿t]
￿
ht ￿ dt (23c)
and ￿t =
‘t ￿ ￿(wt ￿ T (wt)) + (1 ￿ ‘t)￿(b) ￿ ￿(b + ￿t)
￿ ￿ ‘t
; (23d)
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We now explain how to extend the intuitive proof of Section III. Equation (24) de￿nes the
marginal social value of public funds, ￿. It is obtained by a unit increase in E ￿nanced by
a unit decrease in b holding w 7! w ￿ T (w) ￿ b constant. Next, we consider again the small
tax reform depicted in Figure 2. This tax reform has a tax level e⁄ect and a wage response
e⁄ect, each of them being decomposed into mechanical and behavioral components (see Table
1). In the Maximin case, these components only capture the impact on the least well-o⁄ (i.e.
on additional tax receipts to ￿nance the assistance bene￿t b). Now, the government also values
how the utility levels of all other economic agents are a⁄ected by the tax reform. To make the
formula comparable, we divide these additional impacts by ￿, so as to express them in terms of
the value of public funds. For each component, we now examine how the various components
are changed.
Tax level e⁄ect
The rise in the ex-post surplus xt increases the social welfare of the corresponding workers
by ￿0 (wt ￿ T (wt))=￿. Adding this welfare gain to the loss in tax receipts, the mechanical




￿0 (wt ￿ T (wt))
￿
￿




instead of (14). The integral of relation (25) over the skill distribution above a corresponds to the
￿between-skill￿motive of redistribution. Since ￿ averages marginal social welfare over the whole
population and ￿ is concave, the term in parentheses is positive for most workers. This means
that the rise in xt is in general detrimental to the government￿ s objective. This might however
not be true for workers with su¢ ciently low earnings. In this case, the government would increase
21the ex-post surplus with respect to the laissez faire for these workers. In opposition to the case
where the government has a Maximin objective, this would imply a rise in the participation rate
of the less skilled workers.
As far as the behavioral component is concerned, consider individuals of type t who are
induced to participate by the tax reform. Their expected utility levels only change by a second-
order amount. However, this change in participation decisions increases inequalities because
participants￿income is di⁄erent whether they get a job or not. The inequality-averse govern-
ment values this by (‘t ￿ ￿(wt ￿ T (wt)) + (1 ￿ ‘t)￿(b) ￿ ￿(b + ￿t))=￿, which equals ‘t￿￿t (by
De￿nition (23d)) and is negative. So, the behavioral component of the tax level e⁄ect at skill
level t equals




instead of (15). From (23c), the sum of the mechanical and behavioral components over all skill
levels t above a equals ￿￿￿ ￿ (￿w=w) ￿ Za. It is hard to draw clear conclusions about the value
of Za. Still, two opposite e⁄ects are speci￿c to the general utilitarian case. Compared to the
Maximin, raising the ex-post surplus for skills above a is now less detrimental for the social
welfare in terms of the mechanical component but the welfare gain of additional participants is
less important because of the negative induced impact of increased inequalities on social welfare
(the negative ￿t term).
Wage response e⁄ect
In addition to its impact on b through the tax receipts (described in (18) and (19)), the wage
response e⁄ect has also a direct in￿ uence on social welfare through a change in the expected
social welfare of participants of type a, ‘a￿(wa ￿ T (wa)) + (1 ￿ ‘a)￿(b). Holding b constant,
a mechanical and a behavioral component should again be distinguished.
The wage increase ￿wa rises ￿(wa ￿ T (wa)) by the marginal social welfare ￿0 (wa ￿ T (wa))
times the small increase in the post-tax wage (1 ￿ T0 (wa))￿wa. Using (8), the additional
mechanical component expressed in terms of the value of public funds equals:
￿0 (wa ￿ T (wa))
￿




This component has a positive e⁄ect on social welfare. However, the rise in the wage lowers
the employment probability ‘a by ￿‘a = ￿￿ (wa) ￿ (￿wa=wa) ￿ ‘a. Each additional unemployed
individual decreases social welfare by ￿(wa ￿ T (wa)) ￿ ￿(b). Hence, using (7), the additional
behavioral component equals
￿
￿(wa ￿ T (wa)) ￿ ￿(b)
￿




22Adding these two components, then using (16) and (17), we get the welfare consequence of the
wage response e⁄ect
￿





￿ a ￿ ha ￿ ￿a (27)
The welfare consequence of the wage response e⁄ect is negative because it increases inequalities
among participants. This is ￿rst due to the fact that for a given number of unemployed, the ex-
post surplus of each employee increases. Secondly, for a given employee surplus, the number of
unemployed increases. The wage response e⁄ect implies a ￿within-skill￿motive of redistribution
that attenuates the will of the government to mitigate the between-skill inequalities. Thus, this
e⁄ect pushes optimal wages downwards to reduce inequalities among participants and to lower
unemployment.
By adding (27) to the impact (20) of the wage response e⁄ect on the level of the assistance
bene￿t b, one obtains the left-hand side of (23a) times ￿￿ ￿ (￿w=w).
This intuitive proof of Proposition 3 has highlighted that (search) unemployment has two
e⁄ects on social welfare that cannot be recognized if the wage-cum-labor demand margin is
ignored. First, unemployment per se is a source of loss in social welfare which calls for downward
wage distortions. This is captured by the negative sign of (27). Second, because the fate of
participants is not employment for sure, policies that enhance participation have a detrimental
induced e⁄ect on inequality. To see the implication of this second e⁄ect, consider the particular
case where wages are not responsive to taxation ("a = 0 everywhere). Then, the tax level e⁄ect
has to be nil everywhere at the optimum. From (23c), whatever the skill t, the employment tax
should verify:
T(wt) + b











wt ￿ T(wt) ￿ b
(28)
If ￿t was zero, Formula (28) would be identical to Expression (4) in Saez (2002). Then, if the
welfare of low skill workers is highly valued by the government, i.e. if their ability and thus wage
is su¢ ciently low (i.e. such that ￿0 (wt ￿ T(wt))=￿ > 1), the employment tax T(wt) + b should
be negative, meaning that transfers for low income workers, ￿T(wt), are higher than for the
jobless. Now because of unemployment, inequalities between the agents induced to participate
by this policy are increased (since ￿t is negative). This reduces the willingness of the government
to redistribute to low income workers.
When wages are responsive to taxation, the only analytical result in the general utilitarian
case concerns wage distortions at both extremes of the skill distribution. There, as in the
Maximin case, the tax level e⁄ect is nil. Nevertheless, there is a reason to choose an ine¢ cient
wage level. This is because unemployment reduces social welfare. To mitigate this e⁄ect, it is
worth distorting wages downwards at both extremes of the skill distribution.
23Concerning the robustness of Proposition 2 obtained under a Maximin objective, we cannot
say whether nor when the two new terms in (25) and (26) change the sign of the tax level
e⁄ect. We can nevertheless make the following conjectures in line with this proposition. As far
as point i) is concerned, the government has now an additional incentive to reduce wages and
stimulate labor demand since the welfare impact of the wage response e⁄ect (27) is negative.
However, pushing wages downwards obviously reduces social welfare, and the more so as one
moves towards the low-end of the wage distribution. Therefore, compensating transfers for low-
skilled workers are expected. Numerical simulations are needed to throw some light on these
conjectures.
V Simulations
To illustrate how our optimal tax formulae could be used for applied purposes, this Section
proposes a calibration of our model based on the US economy. This enables us to compute
optimal income tax schedules that provide some numerical feel of the policy implications of our
analysis. As the underlying model remains stylized in several dimensions the following simulation
results should only be considered as illustrative.
V.1 Calibration
To avoid the complexity of interrelated participation decisions within families, we only consider
single adults in the US.21 We need to specify the labor demand function L(:;:) and the distrib-
ution of types (a;￿) through functions G(:;:) and f (:). In choosing functional speci￿cations of
L(:;:) and G(:;:), we want to control the behavioral responses "a, ￿a and ￿a de￿ned respectively
by Equations (10a), (10b) and (1). We take





Under this speci￿cation, the ￿rst-order condition (7) for the wage-setting program implies:
wa = c ￿ a ￿ (￿ (wa))
" (29)
Next, we roughly approximate the tax system that is applied to single adults without children
by a linear function T(w) = ￿ ￿w+￿0 with ￿ = 25% and ￿0 = ￿3000. The selection of a value of
b for the current economy determines whether ￿ (w) is lower or larger than 1, and, consequently,
whether wages (and thus unemployment) are distorted upwards or downwards. As a benchmark
and to be consistent with our theoretical analysis where taxes are used only to redistribute
income, we assume that wages are e¢ cient in the current economy, so we take b = ￿￿0 = 3000.
21These are ￿primary individuals￿ , i.e. persons without children living alone or in households with adults who
are not their relatives. They are older than 16 and younger than 66.
24Since ￿ is then constant, the elasticity ￿a of the wage with respect to the skill equals 1 in the
current economy (see 10b), as it would be the case in a perfectly competitive economy. Moreover
" equals the elasticity of the wage with respect to ￿ in the current economy (10a). This elasticity
also equals the compensated elasticity of wage with respect to 1￿T0.22 Following Gruber and Saez
(2002), estimates of the latter elasticity would lie between 0:2 and 0:4. We take a conservative
value " = 0:1 in the benchmark calibration and conduct a sensitivity analysis where " = 0:2.
We set c to 2=3, so that in the current economy, total wage income represents two third of the
total production.23 Finally, we use (29) and the distribution of weakly earnings of the Current
Population Survey of May 2007 to approximate a distribution of skills among employed workers.
Reexpressing variables in annual terms, the range of skills is [$3;900;$218;400].24 Using a
quadratic Kernel with a bandwidth of $63;800 we get an approximation of L(a)G(a;￿a)f (a)
in the current economy which is depicted by the lowest curve in Figure 4.
We then assume that the elasticity of participation varies exogenously with the level of
skill. More speci￿cally, we assume the following cumulative distribution of non-market activities
Pr[￿ ￿ ￿ j a]:25
G(a;￿) = A(a) ￿ ￿￿a where A(a) > 0 and ￿a > 0 (30)
Because, to our knowledge, the empirical literature does not provide any information about






+ ￿a1. We set the elasticity at the bottom, ￿a0, to 0:4 and the elasticity
at the top, ￿a1, to 0:2 in the benchmark calibration and conduct sensitivity analysis. These
elasticities are in line with the evidence summarized by Immervoll et alii 2007 and Meghir and
Phillips (2008).
We adjust scales parameters B (a) and A(a) to get realistic pro￿les of skill-speci￿c unem-
ployment rates and participation rates. The pro￿le of unemployment (resp. participation) rates
is approximated by a decreasing (increasing) function of a:













In our approximation of the current economy, the mean unemployment rate is 5:06%, the mean
participation rate equals 80:3% and the mean elasticity of the participation rate equals 0:29.
Figure 4 depicts the calibrated skill distribution f (a), the distribution of skill among participants
in the current economy G(a;￿a)f (a) and the distribution of skills among employed individuals







23In the equilibrium matching approach, workers receive less than their marginal product because ￿rms have
to recoup their initial investment (￿(a) in the theory developed above).
24The data are collected for wage and salary workers. We ignore weekly earnings below 50$, which corresponds
to the lowest 1:2% of the earnings distribution.
25When we adopt this speci￿cation, we implicitly assume that A(a) is such that one always has ￿a ￿
[A(a)]
￿1=￿a. Otherwise, the participation rate equals one and becomes inelastic.
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Figure 4: Densities f (a), G(a;￿a)f (a) and L(a;wa)G(a;￿a)f (a) in the current economy.
government￿ s budget constraint (11). This leads to an amount E = $5;636 per capita. In the
Bergson-Samuelson utilitarian case, we take ￿(y) = (y + E)1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿), with ￿ = 0:2 in the
benchmark. The exogenous public expenditures ￿nances a public good that generates social
utility that is considered as a perfect substitute to private consumption under this speci￿cation.
V.2 Results
To illustrate Part i) of Proposition 1, let us compare the actual pro￿le of unemployment rates
and the optimal ones under the Maximin and Bergson-Samuelson criteria (Figure 5). The
actual unemployment rate turns out to be too high from a Maximin perspective (except at
the extremes of the skill distribution). From the general utilitarian viewpoint, it should even
decrease further, con￿rming the importance of the welfare impact of the wage response e⁄ect
(27). As an illustration of Part ii) of Proposition 1, Figure 6 shows that a Maximin government
would accept a sharp decline in participation rates. Under the more general utilitarian objective,
optimal participation rates are higher for low skilled workers and lower for high skilled workers.
Since unemployment rates are lower and participation rates are higher at the bottom of the skill
distribution, the tax-schedule is designed to boost low-skill employment.
Marginal tax rates are drawn in Figure 7. Under the Maximin, redistribution takes the
form of a Negative Income Tax (NIT) in the following sense: An assistance bene￿t close to
$14;198 is taxed away at a high, and in this case nearly constant, marginal tax rate close to















Figure 5: Unemployment under the benchmark calibration
low-paid ones, enters the scene. This changes dramatically the form and the level of marginal
tax rates. At the bottom of the skill distribution, the marginal tax rate is negative and then
sharply increases to about 40%. The tax schedule has now the basic features of an EITC-type
taxation. In particular, the level of b equals $1;015 per year, while there is an in-work bene￿t
at the bottom whose level is substantially higher since T(wa0) = ￿$3;167. In order to reduce
the unemployment of the less skilled, the government strongly distorts their wages downwards.
In Figure 7, we have also depicted the optimal tax schedule if the reaction of wages to taxation
is ignored (" = 0). Compared to our benchmark where " = 0:1, the optimal pro￿le is notably
di⁄erent. In particular, the marginal tax rates are lower at the low-end of the wage distribution
since, by assumption, there is no adjustment in wages and hence in unemployment. So, this
Figure illustrates that taking into account or ignoring the wage-cum-labor demand margin has
substantial quantitative implications. Still, the assistance bene￿t and the tax reimbursement at
the bottom are close to those just mentioned (so that the property T(wa0) + b < 0 still holds).
If the sensitivity of wages to taxation is raised from " = 0:1 towards " = 0:2, the wage
response e⁄ects are reinforced. The Maximin optimum therefore implements a tax schedule
where the function w 7! x(w)=w vary less (i.e. the solid curve of Figure 3 becomes ￿ atter)
so as to prevent too important distortions along the wage-cum-labor demand margin. The tax
schedule becomes closer to a linear one, marginal tax rates vary less. The simulations displayed
in Figure 8 show that this also happens along the Bergson-Samuelson optimum.
The other sensitivity analyses we conduct concern the calibration of the elasticity of partic-


















Figure 6: Participation rates under the benchmark calibration.
Maximin case without wage response, Equation (21) implies that the government would choose
higher tax levels as participation responds less, so the dashed curve in Figure 3 is shifted down-
wards. Consequently, in the presence of wage response, the solid curve shifts downwards too.
Hence the Maximin optimum implements higher levels of (T (w) + b)=w and therefore higher
marginal tax rates. Figure 9 quanti￿es this mechanism. Once again, The Bergson-Samuelson
optimum is a⁄ected in a similar way compared to the Maximin optimum.
Last, we change the elasticities of participation so that the relationship a 7! ￿a is steeper
while keeping the average elasticity in the current economy almost constant. For that purpose,
we take (￿a0;￿a1) = (0:48;0:13) instead of (0:4;0:2). To understand the rise in marginal tax
rates displayed by Figure 10, it is again convenient to come back to Figure 3. In the Maximin
optimum without wage response, the government whishes to implement a tax schedule with a
more decreasing a 7! xa=wa function, so the dashed curve of Figure 3 becomes stepper. Hence, in
the presence of wage responses, the distortions along the wage cum labor demand are reinforced
and the solid curve of Figure 3 becomes stepper too. As a consequence, ￿ (wa) are decreased
and marginal tax rates are raised (see 8).
In all the simulation exercises, unemployment rates are even lower at the Bergson-Samuelson
optimum than at the Maximin one. This con￿rms the importance of the welfare impact of the
wage response e⁄ect (27). Participation rates are always higher at the Bergson-Samuelson
optimum compared to the Maximin one. They remain lower than the current ones for high















Figure 7: Marginal Tax Rates under the benchmark calibration
Saez (2001) has simulated optimal marginal tax rates using the empirical distribution of
income to compute the underlying distribution of skills, as we do for our model. He has found
that optimal marginal tax rates are U-shaped whereas we ￿nd a hump-shaped pro￿le in all our
simulations.
One analytical result in HLPV was that an EITC is never optimal. However, as we have
already point in the introduction, participation decisions were treated in a crude way. This was
an important limitation. In particular, Saez (2002) has proposed simulations of optimal tax
rates at the bottom of the distribution with labor supply responses along both the extensive
and the intensive margins. He has showed that an EITC can emerge if the government is not
Maximin. In the present paper, we treat participation decisions more carefully than in HLPV.
Our numerical simulations are then in line with Saez (2002) on this point, and not with HLPV.
VI Conclusions
According to authors such as Immervoll et al (2007), optimal income taxation can be studied
in a competitive framework and the introduction of imperfections would not deeply modify the
equity-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄. By modelling jointly participation decisions, wage formation and
labor demand in a frictional economy, we show on the contrary that this trade o⁄ is deeply
modi￿ed. In the Maximin case, a set of clear-cut analytical properties are shown if the elasticity
of participation decreases with the level of skill. Then at the optimum, the average tax rate
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Figure 8: Dotted curves: " equals 0:2 instead of 0:1 (solid curves).
and participation rates are distorted downwards compared to their laissez-faire values. These
precise recommendations contrast with the small number of analytical properties derived in the
literature following Mirrlees (1971).
When the government has a general utilitarian social welfare function, the equity-e¢ ciency
trade-o⁄is more deeply a⁄ected by the wage-cum-labor demand margin. To induce participation,
the net income of workers should be higher than the one of the non-employed. This creates an
inequality that matters from a utilitarian perspective. Taxation should then promote wage
moderation to reduce the detrimental e⁄ect of unemployment on social welfare. Moreover, the
role of taxation on participation is more complex because some participants will not ￿nd a job.
Therefore, stimulating participation through lower tax levels raises inequalities. Our numerical
exercise shows that optimal unemployment rates are substantially distorted downwards and that
an EITC can be optimal.
The present model could be extended in di⁄erent directions. First, a dynamic model would
enable to introduce earning-related unemployment insurance. Hence, one can expect that a
￿dynamic optimal taxation￿version (￿ la Golosov et alii (2003)) of our model would deliver
interesting insights about the optimal combination of unemployment insurance and taxation
to redistribute income. Second, we abstract from any response of the labor supply along the
intensive margin. Although we are con￿dent that responses along the extensive margin are much
more important, enriching our framework to include hours of work, in-work e⁄ort or educational
e⁄ort belongs to our research agenda. Finally, in the real world, labor supply decisions are







0 20 000 40 000 60 000 80 000 100 000 120 000 140 000
w
Marginal Tax Rates
Maximin Optimum Lower Pi
Bergson-Samuelson Optimum
Maximin Optimum
Bergson-Samuelson Optimum Lower Pi
Figure 9: Dashed curves: (￿a0;￿a1) equals (0:35;0:15) instead of (0:4;0:2) (solid curves)
for future research.
Appendices
A Benthamite e¢ ciency of the laissez-faire allocation
Let U be the Benthamite objective. Consider an equilibrium allocation. There are G(a;￿a)f (a)
participants of type a whose net income is wa ￿ T(wa) if they are employed and b otherwise,





(L(a;wa)(wa ￿ T(:)) + (1 ￿ L(a;wa))b) ￿ G(a;￿a) +
Z +1
￿a
(b + ￿) ￿ g (a;￿) ￿ d￿
￿





(￿a + b) ￿ G(a;￿a) +
Z +1
￿a
(b + ￿) ￿ g (a;￿) ￿ d￿
￿
f (a) ￿ da
where the second equality uses (3). Given the government￿ s budget constraint (11), this objective





L(a;wa) ￿ wa ￿ G(a;￿a) +
Z +1
￿a
￿ ￿ g (a;￿) ￿ d￿
￿
f (a) ￿ da
The Benthamite objective aggregates average earnings plus the value of non-market activities
over the whole population, no matter how they are distributed. In this sense, the Benthamite
criterion is an extreme case.
For each a and Y , the function ￿ 7! L ￿ w ￿ G(a;￿) +
R +1
￿ ￿ ￿ g (a;￿) ￿ d￿ reaches a unique
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Figure 10: Dashed curves: (￿a0;￿a1) equals (0:48;0:13) instead of (0:4;0:2) (solid curves)




















￿ ￿ g (a;￿) ￿ d￿
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a ￿ G(a;￿a) +
Z +1
￿a
￿ ￿ g (a;￿) ￿ d￿
￿





L(a;wa) ￿ wa ￿ G(a;￿a) +
Z +1
￿a
￿ ￿ g (a;￿) ￿ d￿
￿
f (a) ￿ da = U







a at the laissez faire, according to (3).
The second inequality holds because wLF
a maximizes w 7! L(a;w) ￿ w
B Incentive Compatible allocations
Let K be the set of types (a;￿), KP being the subset of participating types and K0 = K ￿ KP.
An incentive-compatible allocation is given by a real number b and a mapping that associates













For any(a;￿) 2 KP : b + L(a;wa￿)xa￿ ￿ b + ￿ (31b)
For any (a;￿) 2 K0 and any
￿
a0;￿0￿





and b clears the budget constraint
b + E =
ZZ
KP
L(a;wa￿)(wa￿ ￿ xa￿)dG(a;￿)f (a)da
32Inequality (31a) ensures that the wage-setting process described by equation (4) induces for an
employed worker of type (a;￿) the wage wa￿ and the associated ex-post surplus xa￿ designed for
her type instead of the wage wa0￿0 and ex-post surplus xa0￿0 designed for any other participating
type (a0;￿0). Inequality (31b) ensures that participating types get a higher expected utility if
they enter the labor force, while condition (31c) ensures that non-participating types are better
o⁄ out of the labor force. It is worth noting that the value of the assistance bene￿t b has no
impact on conditions (31a) to (31c).
We ￿rst consider ((a;￿);(a;￿0)) 2 (KP)
2. From (31a), one obtains




￿ xa￿0 ￿ L(a;wa￿) ￿ xa￿
The ￿rst inequality is obtained by replacing a0 by a in the right-hand side of (31a). The





￿xa￿0. In other words, the government cannot distinguish between participants of the
same skill level, but with di⁄erent values of ￿. This is because the ￿ characteristic is irrelevant
for labor demand and wage-setting decisions and only matters for determining the participation
decisions. Hence, although there is a bidimensional heterogeneity, the screening problem under
random participation ￿ la Rochet and Stole (2002) can be treated as a unidimensional screening
problem by considering (12) instead of (31a) and the allocation can be indexed with respect to
skill a only, as we do in the main text and henceforth in the Appendices.
Let a 7! (wa;xa;￿a) be an allocation such that for all a, ￿a = L(a;wa) ￿ xa and for all a
and a0 (12) is veri￿ed. Condition (12) can be rewritten as:




























Since a0 > a, and @2 logL(a;w)=@a@w > 0, this last inequality requires wa0 ￿ wa. Hence
a 7! wa has to be nondecreasing. It is thus almost everywhere continuous. Take a0 > a. Then









As a0 tends to a, the left-hand side of this condition tends to @ logL(a;wa)=@a. The right-hand
side tends to @ logL(a;wa)=@a as well, for any a where a 7! wa is continuous. Hence, t 7! ￿t
admits a right-derivative for such t = a, which equals to @ logL(a;wa)=@a. Redoing the same






(a;wa) almost everywhere (33)
To show the reciprocal, let a 7! (wa;xa;￿a) be an allocation such that for all a, ￿a =
L(a;wa)￿xa, a 7! wa is non-decreasing and (33) holds. We have to show that (12) holds for all
33a0 6= a. Assume that a0 < a (respectively a0 > a). Then we have for all t 2 [a0;a] (resp. for all




















Integrating (33) between a0 and a, we see that the left-hand side of the last inequality equals to
log￿a ￿ log￿a0. Therefore, one has




which is equivalent to (12).
C Proof of Proposition 1
From (3), one gets that (T (wa) + b)L(a;wa) equals L(a;wa)￿wa￿￿a, so the budget constraint




[L(a;wa) ￿ wa ￿ ￿a] ￿ G(a;￿a) ￿ f (a) ￿ da ￿ E






[L(a;wa) ￿ wa ￿ exp￿a] ￿ G(a;exp￿a) ￿ f (a)da












Since we assume that a maximum exists where wa is a continuous function of a (see footnote






@ (L(a;w) ￿ w)
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= ￿fG(a;￿a) ￿ [L(a;wa) ￿ wa ￿ ￿a] ￿ g (a;￿a)g ￿ ￿a ￿ f (a) (34b)
together with the transversality conditions qa0 = qa1 = ￿a0 = ￿a1 = 0. Using qa1 = 0, Za = ￿qa,
one has Za =
R a1
a _ qt ￿dt. Hence, (34b) with (1) gives (13b). The transversality condition qa0 = 0
gives Za0 = 0 in (13a). From (7), one has
@ (L(a;w) ￿ w)
@w
(a;wa) = (1 ￿ ￿ (wa)) ￿ L(a;wa) ￿ wa (35)










Introducing these two last expressions into (34b) gives the ￿rst equality in (13a).
34D Proof of Proposition 2









(1 + ￿a) ￿ wa ￿ ha (37)
Assume by contradiction that Z is negative at some point. Since a 7! Za is continuous,
there exists an interval where Z remains negative. Given that Za0 = Za1 = 0, this implies the
existence of an interval [a;a] such that Za = Za = 0 and such that Za ￿ 0 for all a 2 [a;a].
￿ Since Za = 0 and Za is negative in the neighborhood on the right of a, one has _ Za ￿ 0.






￿ Since Za ￿ 0, one has from (13a) that ￿ (wa) ￿ 1 for all a 2 [a;a]. Given (8), this implies






￿ Since Za = 0 and Za is negative in the neighborhood on the left of a, one has _ Za ￿ 0.






These three inequalities leads to ￿a ￿ ￿a, so one must have a = a since a ! ￿a is decreasing.
Hence, Za is nonnegative on (a0;a1) and can only be nil pointwise.
Next, assume by contradiction that there exists a2 2 (a0;a1) such that Za2 = 0. Since Za is






However since Za2 = 0, one has ￿ (wa2) = 1 from (13a). Hence, from (8) and the di⁄erentiability
of a 7! wa, xa=wa admits a derivative with respect to a that is nil. Since Za can only be nil
pointwise within (a0;a1), there exists a real a3 in the neighborhood of a2 such that a3 > a2
and Za3 > 0. According to the mean value theorem, there exists a4 2 (a2;a3) such that






Since a4 is in the neighborhood of a2 and a 7! xa=wa has a zero derivative at a2, then
one has (xa4=wa4) ’ (xa2=wa2) at a ￿rst-order approximation. However, (￿a4=(1 + ￿a4)) ’
(￿a2=(1 + ￿a2))+
￿
_ ￿a2=(1 + ￿a2)
2
￿
(a4 ￿ a2) at a ￿rst-order approximation. Hence, since since












which leads to the contradiction. Therefore, Za is positive everywhere within (a0;a1).
From (13a), one has ￿ (wa) < 1 for any a 2 (a0;a1), which has di⁄erent implications.






= ￿1 from (7) and (8). Hence, from (5) wa < wLF
a which means
that optimal wages are distorted downwards. Furthermore, since @L=@w(a;:) < 0, one





and unemployment rates are distorted downwards.
Finally, Za0 = Za1 = 0 induces wa0 = wLF













ii) Since ￿ (wa) < 1, xa=wa is nonincreasing in a, so it is maximized at a0. Since Za0 = 0 and
Za > 0 on (a0;a1), one must have _ Za0 ￿ 0. Therefore, xa0=wa0 ￿ ￿a0=(1 + ￿a0) < 1.
Hence for all a, xa < wa and participation rates are distorted downwards.
iii) x < w for all w implies that the employment tax rate (T (w) + b)=w is always positive.
Moreover, it is nondecreasing since ￿ (w) < 1. So, the average tax rate T (w)=w is increas-
ing in wage w. Finally (8) and ￿ (w) ￿ 1 induces T0 (w) ￿ (T (w) + b)=w, so marginal tax
rate are positive everywhere.
E Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of Proposition 3 extends the one of Proposition 1 in Appendix C. Let ￿ be the












+ (1 ￿ L(a;w)￿(b))
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@ (L(a;w) ￿ w)
@w































￿ ￿a ￿ f (a)
These two conditions with the transversality conditions Za0 = Za1 = 0, (35) and (36) give (23a)
to (23d). Finally, the condition with respect to b is exactly (24).
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